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Abstract
This study focuses on structuring tangible asset backed loans to
inhibit their endemic option to default. We adapt the pragmatic
approach of a margin loan in the configuring of collateralized debt
to yield a quasi-default-free facility. We link our practical method to
the current Basel III (2017) regulatory framework. Our new concept
of the Loan Valuation Adjustment (LVA) and novel method to mini-
mize the LVA converts the risky loan into a quasi risk-free loan and
achieves valuemaximization for the lending financial institution. As a
result, entrepreneurial activities are promoted andeconomic growth
invigorated. Information asymmetry, costly bailouts and resulting
financial fragility are reduced while depositors are endowed with a
safety net equivalent to deposit insurance but without the associ-
atedmoral hazard between risk-averse lenders and borrowers.
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“Conflicts between debt and equity only arise when there is a risk of default. If debt is totally free of
default risk, debtholders have no interest in the income, value or risk of the firm.”
Myers (2001), p. 96
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1 INTRODUCTION
The relevant features of a collateralized loan are the current value of its collateral and the remaining balance and thus
the current exposure. The future value of the collateral is random and contingent on its prospective exposure. Risk
intensifies when themarket value of the collateral declines and the borrower defaults.
As timeprogresses, the default risk is subject to twoeffects. First, uncertainty attached to the value of the collateral.
This becomes acute the closer the term, thereby exacerbating default. Second, loan contracts, such as corporate loans
or mortgages secured on the value of real estate property, involve cash flows that are paid over time. This reduces the
remainingbalances as theunderlying loansamortize through time.Asa result, themaximumexposure is unlikely tooccur
in the first year.1 Themaximum exposure is also unlikely to be in the last years since most of the payments will already
have beenmade by then. It ismore likely that themaximumexposurewill be in themiddle of the tenure of the contract.
This paper proactively proposes a new method for tackling both risk shifting as well as underinvestment. This is
conducted by quantifying and modifying the maximum exposure to default risk by looking forward into the payment
schedule of a loan contract. We show that the probability of default can be minimized by making the initial loan-to-
collateral value ratio small enough. Since themaximum exposure is in most cases located in themiddle of the contract,
a static model focusing on initial exposure or a specific default (terminal) date assumed ex-ante is inappropriate for the
task. An optimal level of debt simultaneously addresses the underinvestment problem for the borrower. Thus, we need
a forward-looking, stochastic and intertemporalmodel to solve this issue. Consequently, we choose a frameworkwhich
is capable of incorporating the impact of: (a) the probability of default; (b) the present value of the maximum lifelong
exposure, on the initial permissible loan to value ratio;while (c) endowing financial flexibility to the borrower to expand
his venture.
Unlike prevailing practice, we go beyond the current exposure at origination approach. We also include the maxi-
mum life-long exposure into our analysis. Therefore, our newmethod also integrates the potential future loss thatmay
occur over the lifetime of a contract due to a borrower defaulting on her/his loan. We are proactive and contribute
above the standard approachwhich normally only considers the current value of the collateral and/or a specific default
date.
Our approach is inspired by the Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA) concept which is now an integral part of the
Basel III (2017) regulatory framework. CVA is the difference between the price of a default-free derivative and the
price of a default-prone derivative, to account for the expected loss from counterparty default. Following the crisis of
2007, CVA adjustments are now required daily by Basel III for exposures to derivatives in the context of counterparty
credit risk.What we essentially do is reverse the logic of CVA. In contrast, the CVA remains only a risk measuring tool.
Our enhanced framework can be applied to decrease (and, ideally, quasi-eliminate) the likelihood of default when
approving the size of collateralized loans. We define ‘Loan Valuation Adjustment’ (LVA) as the difference between the
value of a risk-free loan and the value of a risky loan, such that a default-prone loan has a lower value than a risk-free
loan. This is because a borrower in a default-prone loan may renege on his/her obligations and the bank issuing such
a facility will not receive the scheduled payments, i.e. the amortized fraction of principal plus interest on remaining
balance.
This paper incrementally contributes to the extant literature in four ways described below.
Our first contribution to the literature is to provide a method to minimize the LVA and thus to provide an answer to
the problem of converting a risky loan into a quasi-risk-free loan. Unlike the CVA, which is exogenously driven by the
state variables of the economy2 and thus cannot be changed, our LVA can be proactively implemented and modified.
Our approach looks forward into future points in time for the lifetimeof the loan.Weobtain potential future exposures
at each future time point. We then aggregate positions backwards, taking into account values of the collateral and
remaining balances.We then derive implications on themaximum allowable quasi-risk-free loan which can be granted
today, and thusmaximize its value to the lending financial intermediary institution.
Our second contribution is to offer amethodwhich is capable of mitigating the twin issue of risk-shifting (illustrated
in Figure 1) where the borrower defaults between periods t1 and t2 (when the equity is underwater) and underinvest-
ment (illustrated in Figure 2) when the borrower's cash-flows in period 2 are below its debt obligations. Tackling these
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F IGURE 1 Risk-shifting/strategic default when equity goes underwater: Default-prone collateralized loan
F IGURE 2 Underinvestment when Free Cash Flows of borrower are below debt obligations [Color figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
twin issues is crucial, as they impact on economic fragility, dampen entrepreneurial activity and thus economic growth.
Our approach is linked to the concept of margin loans where: (i) the underlying asset is over-collateralized (to offset
risk-shifting); and (ii) an optimal tenure of facility is evaluated to allow the borrower to meet his/her debt obligations
(to offset underinvestment).
Third, our results are in agreement with the theoretical adverse-selection screeningmodels of e.g. Bester (1985) or
Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001), where good (less-risky) borrowers are required to post collateral and bad (more
risky) borrowers select into loan contracts with no collateral but with e.g. higher interest rates. At first sight such theo-
retical results may seem inconsistent with much empirical work (see for example Berger & Udell, 1990), who find that
collateral is required from high-risk borrowers. However, they are not. If banks systematically apply methods (such as
proposed in this paper) to screenout riskyborrowers, only borrowers able to post enough collateralwould obtain fund-
ing. Riskier projects would need more collateral or would never be launched. However, entrepreneurs with less or no
collateral would be able to fund and implement less risky projects instead. As a consequence, if onewere to use ex-post
performance to partition borrowers into low risk and high risk classes, one would conclude that collateral is posted by
the high-risk borrowers.
Finally, our fourth contribution is to link our framework to the problem of pragmatically eliminating agency issues
fromdebt, where the loan is collateralizedwith tangible (i.e., real) assets. Our proposal is consistentwithMyers (2001),
who infers the efficiency of default-free collateralized loan structure as mitigating agency cost. We: (i) illustrate that
such a structurewarrants a treatment different from that of information asymmetry; (ii) extend the scarce literature on
pricing collateralized loans devoid of agency costs of debt; and (iii) introduce a novel margin approach to collateralized
loan pricing, which provides a way to reduce the fragility of the financial system while endowing financial maneuver-
ability to the borrower.
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Prudent underwriting warrants satisfaction of both (i) asset; and (ii) income constraints to thwart the risk-shifting
and underinvestment issues, respectively. Our loan pricing mechanism is consistent with Baltensperger (1978) who
advocates incorporation of not only the interest rate but also the loan-to-value ratio and the tenure of the facility.
Archer and Smith (2013), and Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008) in their studies extend the parameters by including
borrower income factors.3 This satisfies ahigher order riskmanagement approach in contrast to adhoc credit rationing
practices, and overall loan loss rehabilitation programs (see again Ambrose & Buttimer, 2000; Foote et al., 2008).
Our analysis is from the perspective of a (foresightful) lender, whomakes allowances for the borrower to avoid suc-
cumbing to underinvestment. This implies that the lender makes the prudent assumption that, should the borrower
default, it will be extremely unlikely that the borrower will adequately and timely recover the shortfall outstanding
after the surrendered collateral is auctioned. Furthermore, in order to make our exposition simple, in our set-up we
assume a non-recourse bankruptcy regime (like in the US) and lending against tradable collateral (e.g. a house, like in
mortgage lending). However, in many countries outside the US, personal bankruptcy legislation is very stringent and
surrendering the collateral to the lender does not allow the borrower to escape his debt obligations. Furthermore,
independently of the recourse (or non-recourse) nature of the loan regimewhich affects borrowers, legislation in some
countries tend to protect creditors less. As a result in countries such as France, lendersmay anticipate this and require
more collateral or increase the contract interest rate; see Davydenko and Franks (2008). Our analysis can thus be
expanded to include these different extremities on the lender and borrower sides. (See also footnote 4.)
Mathematically, this paper employs a continuous time setup to follow a sequence of steps, involving amortizing
collateralized debt. However, unlike Ebrahim (2009), who works in discrete time in the context of housing finance
cooperative, we work in continuous time and we derive our contributions from the concept of margin lending in our
novel framework of Loan Value Adjustment. Our paper can thus be seen as an extension of the Ebrahim (2009) analy-
sis (involving homemortgages) to a more rigorous and robust one and based on option pricing technology (involving a
broader corporate sector of the economy). Our analysis is thus improved and our framework superior.
Our analysis is related to Jokivuolle and Puera (2003) who also focus on collateral value. However, the central issue
we aim at in our paper is the exposure pattern through time. Although in their derivations they also use continuous-
time stochastic processes, their model is de facto static, with a unique exposure point. This is because they assume a
single possible default date, which must be known ex ante and which in their model is set the same as the maturity
of the debt. This makes their analysis valid only for zero-coupon, no-repayment case and is counterfactual because
defaults are more frequent in early stages of loans’ life-cycles. In contrast, our model is intertemporal as we examine
the continuum of future exposures, which is the cornerstone of our approach to derive the LVA. Moreover, our model
is more realistic and versatile as it naturally covers themore prevalent amortizing case, where default can occur at any
timewhen principal repayment and interest are due beforematurity.
Our analysis is also related to Frontczak and Rostek (2015) who, unlike our efforts to provide a dynamic risk mea-
sure (LVA), focus on mortgage backed loans and static point measures such as Loss Given Default (LGD). More impor-
tantly, Frontczak and Rostek (2015) note that while Jokivuolle and Puera (2003) use correlated processes for the firm
value on one hand and asset value on the other hand, their formulas “lack of concretion towards realistic values of col-
lateral.” Put differently, and as already noted by Jokivuolle and Puera (2003) themselves, their formulas are technically
correct only when the debtor does not own the collateral. Mathematically, this problem arises because a sum of two
correlated geometric Brownian motions is not a geometric Brownian motion. Similar difficulties also arise in pricing
payoffs which depend on arithmetic price averages, such as Asian options, see Geman and Yor (1993), and approxima-
tionsmust be used, seeChung, Shackleton, andWojakowski (2003). In contrast, our focus is on the exact opposite case,
i.e. when the debtor owns the collateral. This is also the setup adopted by Frontczak andRostek (2015)who, like us, use
a single stochastic process and an amortizing outstanding principal schedule. An interesting feature of the Frontczak
and Rostek (2015) model is, as advocated by Fabozzi, Shiller, and Tunaru (2012), to employ an exponential Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process (instead of the most commonly used geometric Brownian motion) to reflect the incompleteness of
real estate market, seasonality and significant serial auto-correlations observed in house prices. While we focus on a
wider range of loans than mortgages, an obvious extension of our results would be to use the exponential Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process and re-derive our closed form formulas when specializing LVA to mortgage backed debt.
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The implications of our results are very important and are described as follows. The reverberation of the subprime
crisis has led regulators to impose higher capital requirements on banks. Though this moderates moral hazard, it may
not be sufficient if banks ignore to price their loan facilities meticulously. This would then result in handing out to bor-
rowers an in-the-money strategic option to default. We argue that regulators should compel banks to price their debt
facilities in a way that divests the put option to default thereby sterilizing the feedback loop connecting collateral and
credit cycles. Thiswould consequently diminish the funding constraints on borrowers to alleviate the underinvestment
issue. This would eventually strengthen the financial sector, augment its resiliency and boost entrepreneurial activity
in the economy.
This paper is structured as follows. The next Section, 2, discusses the relationship of collateral debt to adverse
selection and moral hazard agency issues. Section 3 discusses the concept behind margin loans, our Loan Valuation
Adjustment (LVA) framework and their relationship to collateralized debt. The subsequent Sections discuss our for-
mal method of structuring collateralized loans to free them from risk of default as much as possible (Section 4) and
constraints required, the asset value constraint (Section 5) and the income constraint (Section 6). The final Section, 7,
concludes.
2 LOAN VALUATION ADJUSTMENT (LVA) FRAMEWORK V.S. AGENCY
THEORY AND BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE
Studies on security design should delve into agency theory or/and behavioural finance as these are now mainstream.
With respect to agency theory we position our paper as follows. Agency theory and our framework reflect the same
or similar effects. That is, risk shifting and underinvestment. In our setup these are induced by a mechanism differ-
ent from information asymmetry. However, while still naming these effects “agency issues,” we argue that risk shifting
and underinvestment arise, respectively, when borrowers have no or not enough “skin in the game” or/and high Debt
Service to Income (DSI) ratio. In what follows we elaborate on themain differences.
The economics literature defines agency issues as emanating from a conflict of interest between a principal and an
agent, where one party has an informational advantage over the other (see Leland & Pyle, 1977). Asymmetric informa-
tion in a financial contract is exemplified when a lender (principal) or a borrower (agent) possesses greater knowledge
than the other. This situation canmanifest itself in two cases. Information asymmetry ex-ante (i.e., prior) or ex-post (i.e.,
after) entering into a financial contract. These are classified as adverse selection and moral hazard, respectively (see
Grossman &Hart, 1983; Stiglitz &Weiss, 1981).
Holmstrom (1979) explores the effect of principal-agent relationship in optimal debt contracts. However, his solu-
tion suggests the use of information systems, which reduce asymmetry with respect to the agent's conduct. Although
imperfect, it can improve the contract economic efficiency, i.e., presumably by treating information asymmetry it
absolves agency issues. Other measures to curb agency costs of debt include (i) call provisions that moderate infor-
mation asymmetry and asset substitution issues; (ii) conversion rights to curb management excessive consumption;
and (iii) income bonds that alleviate bankruptcy problems (seeMyers, 1977).
In the special situation of loans backed by tangible assets focused in this paper, we mitigate both adverse selection
andmoral hazard as follows:
1. The adverse selection issue is resolved by a financier by transferring funds to the buyer of the tangible asset after
conducting an elaborate due diligence processwhere the title of the asset, its structural soundness and its value are
verified. Furthermore, the financier can estimate the ex-ante probability distribution of actual (or imputed) payoffs
from its ex-post risk-return information. This is accomplishedby trading financial claimsover amulti-periodhorizon
(Hosios & Peters, 1989).
2. The moral hazard issue is resolved by ensuring that the title of the tangible asset has a lien on it by the financier to
restrain the borrower from selling it. Furthermore, the financier can add iron-clad covenants to the loan contract
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to preserve the value of the underlying collateral. These include: (i) adequate maintenance of the real asset; (ii)
payment of local taxes; and (iii) minimum insurance coverage (Smith, Jr. &Warner, 1979).
We reiterate the fact that agency issues in our collateralized financial contract do not ensue from asymmetric infor-
mation. They ensue from low “skin in the game” or/and highDebt Service to Income (DSI) ratio (see again our Figures 1
and 2).
As far as behavioural finance is concerned we note that irrational behaviour of agents, and in particular that of
lenders, would be an extension of our framework worth considering. However, like in most studies in financial eco-
nomics we assume that agents are rational here. Under asymmetric information the borrower and the lender might
have divergent expectations about the future profitability of the asset. One might think of a case where the lender
might have an idea of how the borrower would react when forced by her to default, irrespective of the information he
has. However, such logic is incorrect if agents are rational. A rational lender would never make the borrower default in
the interim period t1 to t2 (see Figure 1) since equity is negative in this situation and the lender would suffer a loss of
principal. This would imply that the lender is irrational.
Consistent with the agency perspective of Allen (2001), we treat bankruptcy as arising from endogenous con-
flict of interest. Building on this result, we structure an iron-clad asset backed financial facility that moderates the
agency issues. The goal is to pragmatically price the collateralized loan such that it simultaneously reduces the: (i) in-
moneyness of the embedded put option to default; (ii) negative effect of the feedback loop between collateral and
credit cycles; and (iii) financial constraints on borrowers to invest in the real sector of the economy.
We note, however, that there may be special cases of agency issues stemming from risk-shifting (related e.g. to
strategic default: see Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2013) and underinvestment (related e.g. to predatory loans: see
Bond, Musto, & Yilmaz, 2009) that do not conform to our framework. In these special cases agency issues cannot be
fully purged from the facility (see also Jensen &Meckling, 1976;Myers, 1977).
3 MARGIN LENDING, LOAN VALUATION ADJUSTMENT (LVA) AND
COLLATERALIZED LOANS
Margin lending facilities offered by prime brokers rose to popularity when stock ownership became more common in
thebeginning of the20th century. The ideawas tohelp finance thepurchaseof the stockby supplying only a fraction (or
margin) of its value, whilst the balancewas funded as a loan by the broker. In good states, the borrower benefited from
the high returns on amount invested. For example, from the investor's perspective, the value x of a 20%margin would
grow by 100% (i.e. double) to 2x if the stock rose in value by just 20%. On the other hand, a moderate fall of 20%would
entirely wipe out the initial investment x. For falls below 20% the investor could retain the stock, but would receive a
margin call to deposit additional cash tomeet the shortfall.
Likewise, in the case of collateralized loans, the underlying asset (collateral), whose initial value isP0, is the analogue
of the stock in margin lending. There are no margin calls. But the initial deposit ID (or equity, see below) is wiped out
leaving the borrower to face a dilemma. This is on whether to continue servicing the debt, whose initial value is Q0;
or to exit the asset market by surrendering the same to the lender. Subsequent market values of collateral are random
while the debt is often amortizing to zero over horizon T. A default can occur at time0<𝜏 < Twhen it is either triggered
exogenously or when the better alternative is to surrender the asset to the lender. In the cases provided in the loan
covenant, the lender can subject the borrower to a technical default. The lender then has the right to take over and
dispose the collateral as a protection against the borrower for not responding to the margin call or non-repayment or
default on the debt.
In the above setup the borrower can be seen as having an equity stake (whose initial value is equal to the initial
deposit ID) to acquire the collateral. In particular, this equity can be seen as a call option on the value of the collateral,
Pt , where the strike price is equal to the remaining debt balance,Qt . When the value of the collateral is below the value
of the remaining balance, i.e. Pt < Qt , this call option is out of the money. However, if this happens the borrowers have
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F IGURE 3 Pragmatically default-free collateralized loan (with an upward trending asset)
F IGURE 4 Pragmatically default-free collateralized loan (with a downward trending asset)
an incentive to default on their obligations. This can be interpreted as exercising their put option to default which is
embedded in their contract. The collateral is the underlying asset for this put option and its strike price is also equal
to the remaining debt balance, Qt . Typically, the lender adds a risk premium to the interest rate on the loan contract,
to progressively recoup the cost of this default put option as the debt is being repaid. However, if the decrease in the
value of the collateral is quick and sudden, this exposes the lender to the risk of the default put being exercised.4
Our Figures 1, 3 and 4 exemplify a project (venture) with initial value P0 funded by trading financial claims on the
project payoffs with a financial intermediary. To secure financing, entrepreneur-manager places an initial deposit, ID,
that is further secured by the project payoffs. Hence, the amount financedQ0 is the difference between the two
Q0 = P0 − ID. (1)
The initial deposit acts as a commitment device enforced on the borrower, which (i) locks in up-front equity to the
lender; and (ii) reduces the borrower's risk shifting behavior.
Alternatively, we can represent the lender's exposure using our Loan Valuation Adjustment (LVA) framework as the
difference between the value of a risk-free loan and the value of a risky (default-prone) loan
V = Vf − LVA, (2)
where the default-prone loan, V, has a lower value than a risk-free loan, Vf . As demonstrated with the default put con-
cept, the borrower in the default-prone loan has strong incentives to default on her/his obligations, when the value of
the collateral becomes less than the remaining balance (Pt < Qt). As soon as this happens, the financial institution (FI)
underwriting such loanswill not receive scheduled payments; i.e., theywill miss the amortized fraction of principal plus
interest on remaining balance.
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We argue that LVA should be actively acted upon and adjusted. That is, FIs should minimize the LVA and thus they
should convert the risky loan into a quasi-risk-free loan, so that
maxV ⇔ minLVA⇔ LVA→ 0 ⇒ V → Vf (3)
That is, loan value maximization for the bank can be achieved by minimizing the LVA. This occurs when the LVA tends
to zero which raises the loan level to the risk free value and thus transforms the default-prone loan V into a (quasi)
risk-free (i.e., default-free) loan Vf . We define LVA, similarly to CVA,
5 as the present value of the Q-expectation of the
non-recovered losses resulting from borrower's default
LVA = EQ
[
(1 − R)1{𝜏≤T}e−r𝜏 (Q𝜏 − P𝜏 )+
]
(4)
where R is the recovery rate, EQ denotes the expectation operator under the risk-neutral measure, 𝜏 is the default time
and 1{𝜏≤T} is the default indicator.
4 STRUCTURING COLLATERALIZED LOANS FREE OF THE ENDEMIC RISK
OF DEFAULT
How then do we configure a pragmatically default-free collateralized loan structure that ensures the put option to
default is probabilistically negligible? This has major implications on financial system resiliency considering the nega-
tiveexperienceof collateralized lending in the recent financial crisis and repercussionson lenderof last resort policies.6
We look forward into future points in time for the lifetime of the loan. We obtain potential exposures at each future
time point. We then aggregate positions backwards, taking into account values of the collateral and remaining bal-
ances. We then derive implications on the maximum allowable quasi-risk-free loan which can be granted today, and
thusmaximize its value to the lending financial intermediary institution.
There are divergent perspectives onmodeling default in a debt contract in the literature (see Black& Scholes, 1973;
Duffie & Singleton, 1999; Jarrow & Turnbull, 1995; Merton, 1974). These views are given by: (i) the default intensity
approach of Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), with exogenous default; or the structural approach of Merton (1974), with
endogenous default.
Instead of focusing upon themechanism triggering default, our approach is to ascertain: (i) the put option to default
will never be significantly in-the-money (to avert risk-shifting); and (ii) the borrower has sufficient cash flows to service
his/her debt obligations throughout the tenure of the facility (to avert underinvestment). That is, we impose conditions
under which Pt is unlikely to descend below the remaining balance Qt for all t ∈ [0, T]. This renders the probability of
having Qt < Pt close to 100% at all times over the lifetime of the loan [0, T]. This is achieved by carefully pricing the
endogenous loan parameters: initial loan valueQ0, initial deposit ID and loan tenure T; given the underlying exogenous
factors: initial asset priceP0, itsmean𝜇 and volatility 𝜎, safetymargin 𝛼, the borrower's incomeΘ and incomemultiplier
b. Theaboveparameters andourmethodologyareelaborated in the sectionsbelow.As a result this reduces LVA close to
zero. This ensures that the: (i) borrower does not convey the project risk to the lender; and (ii) lender does not restrain
the borrower's entrepreneurial activities.
The remaining balance of a self-amortizing loan can be stated as
Qt = Q0
1 − exp{−r(T − t)}
1 − exp{−rT}
. (5)
where Q0 is the amount financed and r signifies the lender cost of funds. For tractability, asset prices are assumed to
follow aGeometric BrownianMotion.7 Thus, asset price at time t is given by
Pt = P0exp
{(
𝜇 − 𝜎
2
2
)
t + 𝜎Wt
}
, (6)
WOJAKOWSKI ET AL. 149
where 𝜇 and 𝜎 capture the mean and standard deviation of the period (annual) appreciation (or depreciation, if 𝜇 < 0)
of the asset, respectively, whileWt is a standard BrownianMotion process under the “real world” probability measure.
Figure 1 presents a stylized situation where the entrepreneur-manager equity (project payoff relative to outstand-
ing loan) is ‘underwater’ in period t1 to t2, i.e. Pt < Qt . While it is understood that borrowers with positive equity will
never default, not all borrowerswhose equity is underwaterwill automatically default. Actual default occurswhere the
equity is significantly underwater. That is, the borrower's expectation of future asset prices and non-pecuniary costs
(e.g. income capability, effect on the borrower's credit score) substantially exceeds the benefits of continuing with the
loan repayments (see Ambrose & Buttimer, 2000; Archer & Smith, 2013; Foote et al., 2008).
5 ASSET VALUE CONSTRAINT TO ALLEVIATE RISK SHIFTING
In contrast to its default-prone counterpart, a pragmatically default-free asset is characterized by a safety margin (𝛼)
that ensures the equity to loan ratio is sterilized from asset market volatilities across states of the economy with very
high probability. This is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 for asset market with upward and downward trend, respectively.
This safety margin should be pre-conditioned to accommodate both an upward or downward trend in the asset price
(see again Figures 3 and 4). Moreover, the degree of safety margin required is contingent on specificities of the under-
lying project/asset riskiness.8,9 These obscurities call for stricter safety margin due to the innate difficulties in pricing
such instruments that is consistent with the asset risk weight.
For a debt facility to be nearly default free we require that the asset value Pt should be “sufficient” to pay off the
outstanding loan balance Qt . More precisely, we require that the probability, at all times, is very high, such that the
balanceQt is lower or at most equal to the asset price Pt , reduced by a safety margin
P∗t = Ptexp
{
−𝛼𝜎
√
t
}
, (7)
where the safety margin over time is measured by a multiple 𝛼 of the underlying asset “riskiness” 𝜎
√
t. That is, we
require that theminimal such probability over the lifespan of the loan t ∈, [0, T] is at least equal to y
100
, where y is a very
high confidence level such as 95 or 99
mint∈[0,T]Probability
(
P∗t ≥ Qt
)
= y
100
. (8)
In other words themaximum tail probability of risk-shifting over the life span of the project10 is lower than
maxt∈[0,T]Probability
(
P∗t < Qt
)
< 1 − y
100
. (9)
That is, the tail probability of risk is essentially capped by 1 − y
100
, which in practice is a very small number, e.g. 1%.
For strictly positive P∗t andQt we have the equivalency
P∗t = Qt ⇔ lnP
∗
t ≥ lnQt. (10)
We can thus rewrite the probability which appears in equation (8) as
mint∈[0,T]Probability
(
lnPt − lnQt ≥ 𝛼𝜎
√
t
)
= y
100
. (11)
In the above equation, we have used the definition (7) to substitute P∗t . Thus, the log function of the net equity should
be probabilistically greater or equal to this prudent buffer, 𝛼𝜎
√
t, with high enough probability i.e. above y
100
for all
t ∈ [0, T]. The left hand side of the above equation (11) can be simplified as follows
lnPt − lnQt ≥ 𝛼𝜎
√
t ⇔ ln
P0
Qt
+
(
𝜇 − 𝜎
2
2
)
t + 𝜎Wt − 𝛼𝜎
√
t ≥ 0. (12)
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In the above equation, we have replaced Pt with its definition (6). Defining the d2(t) function of time t, akin to the d2
parameter which appears in the Black and Scholes (1973) formula
d2 (t) =
ln P0
Qt
+
(
𝜇 − 𝜎
2
2
)
t
𝜎
√
t
, (13)
we can rewrite the right hand side of (12) simply as
−
Wt√
t
≤ d2 (t) − 𝛼. (14)
Since −Wt√
t
is a random variable with the standard normal distribution, the probability of staying financially sound at
time t, which appears in condition (8), can be computed explicitly as
Probability
(
P∗t ≥ Qt
)
= Φ
(
d2 (t) − 𝛼
)
, (15)
whereΦ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function and the d2(t) function is defined in equation (13). The
notable difference with the d2 parameter of the Black and Scholes (1973) formula, is that the strike of the default put
optionmodelled here is not constant in timebut is decreasing to zero asmaturity t increases. Intuitively, this decreasing
strike for maturity t is equal to the remaining balance,Qt , defined by Equation (5), which tends to zero at the tenure T
of the facility. Finally, note the linear dependence on themargin adjustment parameter 𝛼 in the argument of the cumu-
lative probability. This yields a very simple and instinctive implementation scheme: (a) compute d2(t); (b) subtract the
sought level of dispersionmultiple 𝛼.
SinceΦ is a strictly increasing function and 𝛼 is an exogenously imposed constant, therefore theminimization prob-
lem (11) can be rewritten as a Kuhn-Tucker problem as follows
mint∈[0,T] d2 (t) , (16)
s.t. Φ
(
d2 (t) − 𝛼
) ≥ y
100
. (17)
Let 𝛼y be a confidence threshold such that
𝛼y : Φ
(
𝛼y
)
= P
(
z ≤ 𝛼y) = y100 ,
where z∼N(0,1). For y = 99 the 𝛼y equals 1.645. Therefore, since Φ is strictly increasing, condition (17) occurs if and
only if d2(t) − 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼y . Minimization (16) can now be represented as
mint∈[0,T]d2 (t) (18)
s.t. d2 (t) ≥ 𝛼 + 𝛼y. (19)
Two situations can occur:
1. The first situation occurs if condition (19) is slack and there is an interior minimum, given by the following first order
conditions
{
d′
2
(t∗) = 0
d2 (t∗) > 𝛼 + 𝛼y
(20)
Solving (20) requires a numerical approach.
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2. Otherwise, condition (19) is binding and there is a corner solution given by
d2
(
t∗
)
= 𝛼 + 𝛼y. (21)
Likewise, solving (21) requires a numerical approach.
After numerically solving either (20) or (21) for t∗, the minimal dollar value of the initial deposit, IDmin, can be
obtained bymultiplying theminimal initial deposit fraction, 1 − ly(t∗), by the initial project value P0. This is explained in
the numerical Example 1 below and illustrated in Figure 5.
Example 1 For our base case parameters𝜇=0.1, r=0.05, 𝜎 =0.2 and T=30 the function d2(t) and the threshold 𝛼 + 𝛼y =
2.645 (chosen so that 𝛼 = 1 and y= 99) are illustrated on Figure 5. It is easily seen that in this case
lim
t → 0d2 (t) = 0
lim
t → ∞d2 = +∞ (22)
and the function d2(t) is strictly increasing over [0, T]. As 0 < (𝛼 + 𝛼y) < +∞, the constraint (19) is therefore binding and there
is a corner solution obtained by numerically solving (21), equal to t∗ = 20.8312. Consequently, the prudent buffer is set at
𝛼𝜎
√
t∗ = 0.2
√
20.8312 = 0.91282. Without optimization (11) over t ∈ [0, T], the maximal loan value would be capped at
the underlying asset value at point t= 0, that is Q0 = P0. This would lead to a loan-to-value ratio of 100%, which exacerbates
moral hazard and thus financial fragility. With the help of optimization the maximal loan amount (for an asset with an upward
trend) is thus reduced and the loan to value capped at
Qmax0 = P0e
−𝛼𝜎
√
t∗ (23)
which gives
lmax0 = ly
(
t∗
)
= e−𝛼𝜎
√
t∗ = e−0.91282 = 0.40139 (24)
to ensure some ‘skin in the game.’ This yields the minimal initial deposit (or ‘skin in the game’) as a function of the underwriting
asset value constraint along with the characteristics of assets
IDmin = P0
(
1 − lmax0
)
= P0(1 − 0.40139) = 0.59861P0. (25)
It should be noted that when an asset follows an upward trend, initial loan disbursed by the financial intermediary
yields a corner solution. In contrast, an asset following a downward trend yields an interior solution (see Figure 4). This
is evaluated by solving for the optimal t∗ in Qt∗ = Pt∗e−𝛼𝜎
√
t∗ . We then work backwards to evaluate Q0 given its rela-
tionshipwithQt∗ and affordability, which is represented by themaximal periodic payment level (amax). This is discussed
in the next Section, 6, where we also extend our analysis to determine the optimal tenure of the lending facility.
6 INCOME CONSTRAINT TO ALLEVIATE UNDERINVESTMENT
The repayability of a fully amortizing loan is contingent on (i) periodic annuitized payments A; as well as (ii) income
capability Θ of the borrower (i.e., firm).11 Define a continuous coupon rate a (analogous to the discrete-time A), for
example as
ea = (1 + A)12 ⇒ a = 12ln (1 + A) , (26)
if A is the corresponding monthly coupon. Prudent underwriting warrants the periodic payments to be within the bor-
rowing firm's income capability
Θ
a
≥ b, (27)
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F IGURE 5 Optimal maximal loan to value ratio andminimal initial deposit fraction [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: Solving numerically for critical t∗ given sought security level y, 𝛼y gives the correspondingmaximal loan to value
ratio ly(t∗) and the corresponding “skin in game” represented here as a percentage 1 − ly(t∗) of the initial project value
P0.
where b is the incomemultiplier. By rearranging this rule, one can restate themaximal periodic payment as
amax =
Θ
b
. (28)
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The net loan equation
Qt =
T
∫
t
ae−rsds = a
r
(
e−rt − e−rT
)
(29)
evaluated at t= 0 gives12
Q0 =
a
r
(
1 − e−rT
)
. (30)
Themaximal loan amount can thus be restated as follows
Qmax0 =
amax
r
(
1 − e−rT
)
. (31)
Imputing solutions forQmax
0
(23) and amax (28), we can derive theminimal loan tenure Tmin.We proceed from the follow-
ing starting condition
P0e
−𝛼𝜎
√
t∗ = Θ
b
1
r
(
1 − e−rT
)
. (32)
By taking the natural logarithm of this function, theminimal loan tenure is given as
T ≤ Tmin = −1r ln
(
1 −
brP0e
−𝛼𝜎
√
t∗
Θ
)
. (33)
Thus, for Tmin to be a positive, finite real number, the logarithmmust be a negative real, implying
0 <
brP0e
−𝛼𝜎
√
t∗
Θ
< 1. (34)
Note that:
1. If income capacity is infinite i.e.Θ=∞, then equation (33) implies Tmin = 0. That is, the debt can be repaid instantly;
2. On the other hand, for the critical value of income,
Θmin = brP0e−𝛼𝜎
√
t∗ , (35)
the debt must be perpetual, i.e. Tmin = ∞; and
3. For anyΘ < Θmin the entrepreneur is priced out i.e. has insufficient capacity to afford the debt.
We thus derived the optimal loan conditions (maximum initial debt Qmax
0
, maximum initial loan to value lmax
0
, mini-
mum initial deposit IDmin and theminimal loan tenure Tmin) as a function of the borrower's (i.e., firm's) incomeΘ, under-
writing asset value P0 and income constraints (𝛼,y,b), exogenous interest rate r, along with asset characteristics (𝜇,𝜎).
For base case numbers 𝜇 = 0.1, r = 0.05, 𝜎 = 0.2, T = 30, 𝛼 = 1 and y = 99 we obtain t∗ = 20.8312. Now for b, P0, Θ
arbitrarily set at b= 5, P0 = 350 andΘ= 100we have
brP0e
−𝛼𝜎
√
t∗
Θ
= 5 ∗ 0.05 ∗ 350 ∗ e
−1∗0.2
√
20.8312
100
= 0.35122 < 1
and the following conditions are satisfied:
• Finite repayment time (expressed in years)
Tmin = −
1
0.05
ln (1 − 0.35122) ≈ 8.7 < ∞ (36)
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• Sufficient income:
Θmin = brP0e−𝛼𝜎
√
t∗ ≈ 35 < Θ (37)
• Maximal loan amount, lower than the value of the collateral:
Qmax0 = P0e
−𝛼𝜎
√
t∗ ≈ 140 < 350 (38)
• Maximal LTV ratio:
lmax0 ≈ 40% (39)
• Skin in the game:
IDmin ≈ 210 (40)
In summary, meticulously structuring pragmatically default-free collateralized loan involves calibrating the loan
endogenous parameters (initial deposit, loan repayment, and tenure) contingent on the exogenous parameters (initial
collateral value and its asset volatility, including the safetymargin, discount factor, the borrower's income capacity and
its multiplier).
7 CONCLUSION
This paper discusses the vital issue of expunging agency costs of debt, comprising of both risk-shifting and underinvest-
ment issues.We take amicro-economic stance to develop an algorithm involving option pricing technology. That is, we
first start with a single project encompassing a risky real asset and illustrate the effacing of agency issues endemic in
its underlying financial facility. Riskiness of the real asset is modelled via equation (6), which is the simplest but com-
putationally tractable and well established way of modelling random increments of prices in continuous time.13 Thus,
once the option to default and the distress of underinvesting is obliterated for a single project firm, one can extend
our same analysis to a firm with multiple projects — or, indeed, many firms with different projects in the economy, as
in the KMVmodel14 which also employs (correlated, but, in the limit, identical) GBM processes. This is the foundation
model for capital requirement formulas of Basel III (2017), and formerly Basel II — despite the correlations between
the projects. This is because the correlations merely change the payoff distributions without impacting on our option
pricing methodology. If each firm's debt is default-free or risk-free, correlations between the risk-free facilities of the
firms in the economy do not matter. We can then use the principle of aggregation on the firms in a macro-economy to
eradicate themenace of banking crisis. Our results in this sense are “overwhelming” (no pun intended).
Despite well established literature on the risk-reducing feature of collateral in loan contracts, the spate of loan
defaults and repo run in the recent financial crisis underscores thatmere presence of collateral does not fully dissipate
default risk. The unravelling of sophisticated securitization and rehypothecation of debt instruments that emanates
from poor loan practices emits system-wide financial fragility. Recent regulation is reactive rather than proactive in
addressing the shortcomings of securitization (Foley, 2014). It also calls for steeper capital adequacy to bootstrap liq-
uidity risk but with an attached economic cost (Hammond & Masters, 2013). We argue that post-crisis resolutions
should be supplemented with upfront prudent underwriting practice, which is economically efficient to credit rehabil-
itation or bailout programs.
In this paper, we rationalize underwriting investable ‘safe’ assets. We contrast pragmatically default-free collater-
alized loans with default-prone risky loans. The former are characterized as ones that do not allow the put option to
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default to be significantly in-the-money, while the latter either have or will have their put options to default deep in-
the-money.We illustrate that default-prone (risky) collateralized loans lead to potential disintermediation, i.e., negate
intermediary's core role of (i) asset transformation, and (ii) deposit custodian functions. Subsequent churning (secu-
ritization and rehypothecation) of a default-prone solutions, as exemplified by the repo run in the recent crisis, only
transfers but not absolves the default risk to other market participants.
Our findings concur with Ebrahim and Hussain (2010) in that default-prone collateralized loan has a receding eco-
nomic efficiency with heightened agency cost accruing to the risk of default. This is significant where the (i) recovery
rate is stochastic with cram down actions by the borrower, or (ii) if recoveries from foreclosures are extremely low. In
this situation, a pragmatically default-free loan is the only economically efficient solution. Even when agency costs are
marginal, default-prone loan ranks at best economically neutral to its competing counterpart. This arises from the loan
pricing that involves lender bearing the agency costs of debt. The above observations are distinct from the static and
dynamic trade off results of Myers (1984) and Strebulaev (2007) who aggregate the welfare of the opposing agents
leading to erroneous result in poor states of economy.15
Pricing pragmatically default-free collateralized loans involves calibrating the endogenous loan parameters subject
to its asset and income constraints that enable us to reduce the risk-shifting and underinvestment issues respectively.
Our approach is consistentwith that ofArcher andSmith (2013) andEbrahim (2009), Baltensperger (1978), Foote et al.
(2008). This encompasses stripping the put option to default by ensuring the borrower's equity does not deteriorate
into a negative region over all states of economy (i.e., for both types of asset with an upward or downward market
trend). This strategy simultaneously sterilizes the feedback loop between collateral and credit cycles. By ensuring that
borrowermaintains adequate ‘skin in the game,’ it resolves the fragility and conflict of interest between financial inter-
mediary and the borrower.
Our results provide policy implications in reinforcing the resilience of the present financial architecture. Regula-
tors should emphasize the meticulous structuring of pragmatically default-free loans to mitigate financial fragility, in
conjunction with granting firm's financial maneuverability or flexibility. This warrants: (a) sterilizing the put option to
default by ensuring that borrowers maintain adequate ‘skin in the game’ (minimizing risk shifting tendencies); and (ii)
evaluating an optimal tenure of the facility (minimizing underinvestment tendencies) over the duration of the loan.
More importantly, constraining the put option to default endows depositors’ similar security to a financial system
with deposit protection scheme but without the moral hazard issues associated with such guarantees. Intuitively, this
should prevent systemic crisis in a highly networked financial system and minimize cost on public funds arising from
bailouts of failed financial intermediaries. Likewise, making allowance for affordability endows financial flexibility to
firms. This allows them to undertake new projects thereby facilitating economic expansion. To sum up, the results of
our study have the potential of not only reinforcing the resilience of the financial architecture but also that of promot-
ing entrepreneurial activity and thus economic growth.
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ENDNOTES
1 For example, a 30-year mortgage normally requires an initial loan to value ratio such as 90% or lower and an instant decline
in the value of the house by 10% ormore during the first year is rather unlikely, at least in a non-turbulent economy.
2 Quantifying CVA typically involves simulating risk factors at numerous future points in time for the lifetime of the deriva-
tives’ book, re-pricing positions at each time point, and aggregating positions on a path consistent basis, taking into account
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netting and collateral posted or received. In particular, there is no specific guidance on the methods used to calculate CVA.
See Chatterjee (2015).
3 Archer and Smith (2013), and Foote, Gerardi, andWillen (2008) observe that the debt-to-income ratio and unemployment
rate positively influence the put option to default.
4 In the case of amortizing debt considered here the default put can only be exercised prematurely as it's value converges to
zero at maturity T as the strikeQt decreases to zero.
5 See Brigo andMasetti (2005) and Basel III (2017).
6 Moe (2012) documents the recent shift in the traditional role ofCentral Banks froma lender of last resort tomarketmaker of
last resort and, lately, as a quasi-fiscal agent with respect to quantitative easing policies. Measures to stabilize the financial
system have also impacted widening Central Banks’ balance sheet due to the more accommodative collateral policies in
exchange for its liquidity funding.
7We intentionally simplify exposition to the necessary minimum to preserve clarity in linking our mathematical model to the
current Basel III (2017) regulatory framework. As a consequence of this simplification the economic content of our model
may appear to beminimal. However, our framework can easily be extended to incorporate manymore realistic features, for
example: (a) jumps in asset prices by addingPoisson jumps to the diffusion as discussed inMerton (1976); (b) stochastic debt;
etc.
8 The asset riskiness is influenced by its redeployment value (Benmelech & Bergman, 2011), transaction/dissipative costs
(Boot, Thakor, & Udell, 1991; Jokivuolle & Puera, 2003; Lacker, 2001), asset drift, volatility and correlation with other firm
assets (Jokivuolle & Puera, 2003). The duration gap between the loan default and repossession time of the collateral could
also be accounted for in assessing the asset value.
9 See Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009) for imprecision effects in: (i) pricing of structured products; and (ii) estimation of their
default risk. Rajan, Seru, and Vig (2010) link this to a Lucas critique failure to appropriately recognize the behavior of the
agent (borrower) and impact on the underlying asset (collateral).
10 This can be conceptualized as the lifetime probability of the worst case scenario.
11 The assumption of a fully amortizing loan is for illustrative purposes. In our conceptual model, it results in a concave lien
profile. This is opposite to that of a semi-amortizing loan that has a convex lien profile.
12 This is analogous toQ0 = A𝛾
1−𝛾T
1−𝛾
.
13 For the literature that asset prices follow aGeometric BrownianMotion (GBM) see Hull (2012).
14 See Vasicek (1987) and Vasicek (1991).
15 Both studies aggregate the two adversarial claimants (debt and equity) objective functions, thereby depriving the analysis
of supply and demand functions and hence the optimal pricing parameters of debt.
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